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Abstract
This article analyzes teacher strikes in Argentina during 2006-2012. It stands 
out how teacher strikes prevail over claims from other unions, and are shown 
to be relevant events for education policy just for some provinces and only for 
public schools. We found that none of the policy measures implemented over 
the last decade has proven to be effective in reducing conflict. Analyzing a 
dataset on labour unrest, this study builds an index of teacher labour conflict 
to better understand the evolution of teacher strikes over time and under the 
various provincial governments that integrate the Argentinian federal education 
system. The article shows no correlation between teacher labour unrest and the 
growth of private enrolment. However, we note that despite the lack of statistical 
correlation, teacher strikes should not be ruled out as an explanatory variable of 
the increase in private education in Argentina. 
Resumen
Este artículo analiza las huelgas docentes en Argentina para el periodo 
2006-2012. Se destaca cómo las huelgas de maestros prevalecen sobre los 
reclamos de otros sindicatos y constituyen eventos relevantes solo para algunas 
provincias, y solo para las escuelas públicas. Se advierte que ninguna de las 
medidas de política educativa aplicadas en el periodo ha sido eficaz en la 
reducción de conflictos. A partir del análisis de un conjunto de datos sobre 
conflictividad laboral, el estudio construye un índice de conflictividad docente 
(tci) para comprender mejor el comportamiento de las huelgas de maestros en 
el tiempo y bajo los distintos gobiernos provinciales que integran el sistema 
educativo federal argentino. El análisis muestra que no existe una correlación 
entre la conflictividad laboral docente y el crecimiento de la matrícula privada. 
Por último, advertimos que a pesar de la falta de correlación observada, el 
conflicto laboral docente no debe descartarse como variable explicativa 
del aumento de la educación privada en la Argentina.
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Introduction: Private Education in 
Argentina
The Argentine education system has experienced a long-standing 
process of privatisation with private school enrolments grow-
ing both in absolute and relative terms over the last fifty years. 
Early works on the subject have showed the singularity of the 
Argentine case fifteen years ago (see, for example, Narodowski 
& Andrada, 1999 and 2001; Morduchowicz, 1999.) This pro-
cess of privatisation of education, which began in the 1960s, has 
experienced an important increase since 2003, becoming an 
unprecedented phenomenon in the history of the country 
(Narodowski & Moschetti, 2014.)
Argentina is a country with a federal political administration, 
which presents 24 provinces that administer their own educational 
systems, with national policy coordination and some federal 
education funding. Differences between provinces are very 
important in terms of area, number of inhabitants, gross product, 
type of economic activity, and party and political organization. 
For example, while in the City of Buenos Aires the gdp per capita 
in 2011 reached $127,997, in the province of Santiago del Estero 
it amounted to only $8,285 (iee, 2012).
Despite these noticeable differences, in 23 out of the 24 
federal jurisdictions, the number of private school students has 
grown more than the number of students in public schools for 
all levels—kindergarten/pre-school, primary and secondary 
education—. During the period 1996-2012, in provinces such as 
Tierra del Fuego, Jujuy and Catamarca the enrolment in private 
Resumo
Este artigo analisa as greves docentes na Argentina para o período 2006-2012. 
Destaca-se como as greves de professores prevalecem sobre os reclamos de 
outros sindicatos, e constituem eventos relevantes só para algumas províncias, 
e só para as escolas públicas. Adverte-se que nenhuma das medidas de política 
educativa aplicadas no período, tem sido eficaz na redução de conflitos. A partir 
da análise de um conjunto de dados sobre conflito do trabalho, o estudo constitui 
um índice de conflito docente (tci) para compreender melhor o comportamento 
de graves de professores no tempo, e baixo os distintos governos provinciais 
que integram o sistema educativo federal argentino; a análise mostra que não 
existe uma correlação entre o conflito de trabalho docente e o crescimento da 
matrícula particular. Por último, advertimos que a pesar da falta de correlação 
observada, o conflito de trabalho docente no deve descartar-se como variável 
explicativa do aumento da educação particular na Argentina.
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schools has increased in 106, 90 and 
88 percentage points respectively 
above enrolment in public schools 
(Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015).
Even though it is true that during 
the years of the big economic crisis 
in Argentina (2001-2002) the enrol-
ment in private schools shows a slight 
decline (-0.4%), between 2003 and 
2012 it increased by 20% for the 
three levels of the education system 
(Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015).
Taking as a starting point the year 
2003—the first year after the socio-
economic meltdown and the early 
administration of President Néstor 
Kirchner followed by President Cristina 
Kirchner1— primary private education 
has grown by 22 % until 2011, while 
public primary education has lost 6 % 
of its enrolment. According to official 
data, in 2003 70 % of primary school 
students from Greater Buenos Aires 
attended a public school; in 2011 it 
was reduced to 60 %. Provinces like 
Catamarca, Jujuy, La Rioja, Santa Fe 
and Mendoza have lost more than 
10 % of their public primary school 
students, and Santa Cruz 15.2 % 
(Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015).
As for the other levels of the 
education system, in kindergarten/
pre-school/early education (schools 
that admit children up to 5 years of 
age) the total amount of students 
grew by 17.7 % but at a rate of only 
11.3% for the public sector and 
34.4% for the private sector. In sec-
1 Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2011 and 
2011-2015).
ondary school, total enrolment grew. 
Public enrolment grew by 6 % and 
private by 10.6 %. 
This growth in the number of stu-
dents is endorsed by the financial 
support on behalf of all provincial 
governments to private education; a 
policy of supply-side subsidies (aimed 
at funding teacher salaries) that pri-
vate schools have been receiving 
for half a century. Data show that subsi-
dies to private education have remained 
stable and accompanied the growth in 
enrolment (Moschetti, 2013).
For a long time, it was believed 
that this process of privatisation of 
education was the effect of neoliberal 
educational policies implemented in 
the 1990s (Puiggrós, 2003; Torres, 
2008). However, a recent work has 
shown that the growth of private edu-
cation enrolment corresponds to long 
periods spanning from education 
policy efforts of both “neoliberal” 
and “post-neoliberal” governments 
(Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015). In 
fact, since 2003 and with govern-
ments against neoliberal policies, 
private education has grown in an 
unprecedented way in the history of 
Argentina.
Within the explanatory framework 
of the growth of private education, 
the idea that successive and massive 
teacher strikes are causing the 
movement of families from public 
to private schools is a common-
sense assumption of the media 
and the political and academic 
debate, despite the lack of studies 
that confirm so (Bottinelli, Herrera, 
Almirón & Stegman, 2013).
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The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it attempts to analyze 
the behavior of teacher strikes in Argentina, both nationally and 
at the provincial level, considering their prevalence in relation to 
claims from other unions and their relative weight in each educa-
tional jurisdiction. Second, the study aims to find whether there is 
an association between class days lost due to teacher strikes and 
the growth of enrolment in private schools.
This article is structured as follows. We first describe the 
functioning of the Argentine education system by means of the 
notion of quasi-State monopoly as a way of understanding 
the interaction between public and private provision over the 
last decades. We then offer a review of the most relevant studies 
that conducted research on educational labour conflict both in 
Argentina and other countries. Then, we provide an in-depth 
characterization of the teacher strikes phenomenon in Argentina 
between 2006 and 2012 and present an index that enables the 
comparison of its magnitude between educational jurisdictions. 
Section 5 explores the linkage between teacher strikes and the 
growth in private enrolment. Finally, Section 6 draws on some 
conclusions and offers general policy implications for the case. 
Private School Choice, Teacher Strikes  
and Quasi-State Monopoly  
of the Education System
There is little evidence regarding the reasons for the exit from 
the public sector and moving to the private sector in Argentina. 
The latest study on this topic found that teacher strikes and loss 
of school days are one of the causes of exit stated by parents of 
different social sectors, although it is neither the only one nor the 
most important (Scialabba, 2006). This study also confirms that 
33 % of parents with children in public schools would switch to a 
private institution if they had sufficient financial resources to do so. 
Recent studies have also shown that private school choice is 
positively correlated with the existence of extracurricular activities 
in the private sector, which are infrequent or not offered at all in 
public schools (Gertel, Cámara, De Cándido & Gigena, 2013).
Some research show that the increase of private school choice 
is a result of segregation processes and especially socio-economic 
self-segregation. These processes are not exclusive to the middle 
class (Tiramonti & Ziegler, 2008); even the social sectors with 
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fewer resources exit the public school 
as a means of distinction regarding 
upward social mobility (Gómez 
Schettini, 2007).
To provide a structural explana-
tion of this process, Narodowski 
developed the notion of quasi-State 
monopoly, in an attempt to under-
stand the interaction between public 
and private supply structures 
(Narodowski, 2008; 2011). The 
core of this framework presents the 
conceptualization of a classic work 
by Jean D’Aspremont and Jaskold 
Gabszewicz (1985). These authors 
analyze the situation in which, due 
to the steady increase in demand, an 
existing monopoly structure enables 
the generation of a new closed sup-
ply structure, provided that this is 
limited. It means that it captures 
only the excess demand that the old 
monopoly cannot absorb because of 
its various structural restraints, which 
do not allow full coverage of the 
demand. On this condition, the new 
sector does not directly compete with 
the traditional monopoly, but rather 
contributes to its continuity by pro-
viding coverage where the old State 
monopoly is not capable of doing so. 
Thus, the old monopoly can continue 
to operate on its captive demand, 
while it opens the opportunity for the 
development of a new supply sector.
The complete structure, that is, 
both the old traditional monopoly 
and the new supply structure, is 
called “quasi-monopoly”. In line 
with previous works (Narodowski, 
2008, 2011) and in direct reference 
to Hirschman’s classic work (1970), 
the old monopoly has been called the 
“traditional sector” (since it refers to 
the predominant modality in the 
organization of the schooling supply 
where provision is entirely public) 
and the new sector, “exit sector”, 
composed of private schools (some 
of which receive State funding)that 
capture those who abandon the 
pre-existing structure of educational 
supply.
The Argentine educational system 
scenario can be summarized, then, 
with the description of a quasi-
monopoly (Narodowski, 2008). On 
the one hand, there is a traditional 
sector of schooling, monopolized 
by the State and formed by public 
schools, which serves mainly the 
lower-income households. On the 
other hand, there is an exit sector 
of private schools that is functional 
to the State sector in terms of effi-
ciency of government expenditure. 
These private schools usually serve 
middle and high-ses households 
and have greater leeway to define 
and structure their own school 
projects following a ‘school-based 
management’ rationale (Gasparini, 
James, Serio & Vázquez, 2011; Nar-
odowski, Gottau & Moschetti, 2013). 
In line with the studies cited above, 
it is possible to conjecture that the 
behavior of each sector can be 
explained by the operation of the 
whole; i.e. by the inclusion of new 
students to the educational system, 
by the regulation and funding of the 
State, and by the general economic 
and social conditions in which these 
actions occur. Thus, the concept of 
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quasi-monopoly provides understanding of the fact that the 
increase in enrolment in private education in Argentina is not 
the effect of a “withdrawal”, “weakness” or “disappearance” of 
the State, but of a conversion of its actions. This involves moving 
from a monopolistic administration of the school system to a more 
complex kind of administration that helps ensure the quantita-
tive growth of the educational system, not in the traditional way 
by increasing enrolment in public schools, but combining and 
balancing its growth with that of private schools.
Teacher Strikes as an Educational Problem
Teacher strikes are a recurring topic in the Argentine education 
debate (Botinelli, Herrera, Almirón & Stegman, 2013). It is usually 
pointed out that the loss of school days due to strikes generates 
low educational quality, hinders continuity in studies, tarnishes 
the institutional image of the schools in which these measures 
are taken, and increases enrolment in private schools (since 
strikes occur almost exclusively in public schools), among other 
consequences. 
However, the absence of studies on this issue is certainly 
remarkable. This is one of the allegedly “hot spots” in the media 
agenda dedicated to education, but such concern does not seem 
to be reflected in the agenda of studies and academic or techni-
cal research, where the impact of teacher strikes in the education 
system has been rarely addressed. 
Some classical studies have shown the relationship between 
teacher working conditions and the quality of education 
(Narodowski & Narodowski, 1988; Narodowski, 1990). Other 
recent works have shown teacher strikes emerging as a way to 
resist political or pedagogical education reforms (Gentili, Suárez, 
Stubrin & Gindin, 2004). In this sense, the work of Murillo and 
Ronconi (2004) has shown the enormous political influence of 
teacher strikes, and how, in this scenario, Argentine teacher unions 
have built political power. Current studies have looked into the 
social characteristics of teachers (Donaire, 2009) and have even 
quantified strikes in Argentina, but for the purpose of confronting 
them with strikes from other worker unions (with the database 
on social protests of the Research Program on Argentine Society 
Movement) or with other databases (Chiappe, 2011).
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Regarding legal analysis, Bravo 
presented legal and jurisprudential 
evidence concerning the conflict 
between the constitutional right to 
strike (for teachers) and the consti-
tutional right to learn in institutions 
where teacher strikes occur (Bravo, 
1996), given that teacher strikes are 
allowed in Argentina, unlike in other 
countries (Belot & Webbink, 2010).
International literature does not 
provide much evidence on the sub-
ject, except in some Latin American 
studies. Martin Carnoy (2005) illus-
trates the Argentine case in this way:
In Argentina, a highly 
developed country in 
many ways, elementary 
students attend school for 
an average of four hours 
a day, or less than 750 
hours a year. However, 
the absences of teachers 
are relatively common 
in many provinces, and 
many days during the year 
are lost in strikes by teach-
ers. (Carnoy, 2005, p. 8)
As a consequence —the author 
explains— the quality of education 
declines, in spite of the teachers’ 
‘good intentions’: “The main losers in 
the game that protects existing inter-
ests are children at the bottom of the 
social scale” (Carnoy, 2005, p. 11.)
Other studies have tended to 
estimate the impact of the action 
and the strength of teacher unions 
in educational policy measures, in 
the regulations of the education sys-
tem, especially those related to the 
administration of teachers as human 
resources. Hoxby’s article (1996) 
was a pioneer in showing how the 
unionisation of teachers has reduced 
productivity and has had a negative 
impact on student performance. 
From that article onwards, there 
have been other investigations 
(Belot & Webbink, 2010; Lott and 
Kenny, 2013; Moe, 2011; Murillo, 
2012 among the most recent ones) 
which have provided evidence or 
have discussed some issues related to 
the validity of the inference that con-
nects the action of the unions with the 
“products” of the school system, such 
as student performance. However, 
teacher strikes in these studies are 
not particularly differentiated from 
actions taken by other unions and, 
therefore, its consequences (espe-
cially the actual loss of class days 
for students) can only be assumed in 
an indirect way. A different view on 
the impact of neoliberal reforms on 
education systems from the perspec-
tive of teachers’ work can be found in 
Sinclair, Ironside and Seifert (1996).
Some other works have done 
research specifically into teacher 
strikes. Miriam Shenkar and Oded 
Shenkar’s article (2011) analyses 
teacher strikes in the context of a work 
dispute in Israel and concludes that the 
formation of certain labour and social 
group identities are a component as 
well as a consequence of strikes. The 
phenomenon has been compared 
to similar studies in other coun-
tries: Athanasiades and Patramanis 
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(2002) for the case of Greece, Carter (2004) for the case of England, 
Gaziel and Taub (1992) who compare Israel to France, among 
others.
In short, there is not much evidence in international academic 
research on the direct impact of teacher strikes on the dynamics 
of the educational system. For the Argentine case, there is a wide-
spread assumption that they cause a number of negative effects: 
direct harm to students whose classes are suspended as a result 
of industrial action, which would contribute significantly to the 
choice of private schools by families. Notwithstanding the forego-
ing, until now there was no statistical evidence which seriously 
presented the consistency of this relationship.
Argentine teacher strikes inside out
To provide some explanations, we resorted to the database of 
labour conflict generated by the National Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security (Chiappe, 2011; Etchemendy, 2013). This 
database is produced on an annual basis and brings together all 
labour disputes occurred in the country in the period 2006-2012. 
This official database records all the different types of labour dis-
putes. It indicates the number of strikes by province, unfortunately 
it does not indicate the number of days covered by each walkout. 
However, the database includes the record of a more interesting 
series of data than that of strikes, that of its quantifiable effect: the 
individual working hours not worked due to strike action.2
A first result of the analysis allows comparison between the 
importance of teacher strikes and industrial action in other 
branches of economic activity and employment in Argentina 
(Figure 1).
For the period 2006-2012, 51.2 % of the working days lost 
due to strikes in Argentina correspond to the education sector. Of 
these, 34.2 % correspond to public school teachers and only 3.4 % 
to private school teachers (while the remaining 13.6 % refers to 
labour disputes involving non-teaching personnel: administration, 
caretakers, assistants, etc.3) The other areas with high labour dis-
pute ratio are public administration (25.7 %) and health (20.7 %), 
where State involvement is also prevalent.
2 It refers to the days not worked due to teacher conflicts multiplied by the number of 
teachers supporting the measure (Chiappe, 2011; Etchemendy, 2013.)
3 The labour conflict survey records teacher strikes in all levels and kinds of schools in the 
education system.
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Even if it is acknowledged that the 
number of teachers in Argentina is 
high (in terms of persons employed, 
teaching is the third branch of eco-
nomic activity in importance, after 
trade, manufacturing and public 
administration) and that the graph 
of lost working days is influenced by 
the amount of work force employed, 
it is possible to infer that, in abso-
lute terms, the strikes in Argentina 
are mostly bound to the educational 
sector and virtually hegemonized 
by public school teachers. Evidence 
shows that for the period 2006-2012, 
when referring to strikes in Argentina 
one is mainly addressing strikes in 
public educational institutions.
To illustrate this question, we pres-
ent the annual evolution of the lost 
working days for the period 2006-
2012. This shows days lost because of 
teacher strikes in the State and private 
sectors of education in relation to 
other branches of activity (Figure 2).
As it can be seen, State teacher 
strikes show a differentiated behav-
iour with respect to measures taken 
by other workers: while strikes by 
workers in activities other than edu-
cation peaked in 2008, teacher strikes 
that year show a decline. Conversely, 
in 2009 the level of teacher conflicts 
grew while conflicts in other indus-
tries decreased.
The graph illustrates a surpris-
ing element: working days lost due 
to teacher conflicts have an erratic 
behaviour, which does not allow 
make any inferences about a clear 
trend, neither upward nor downward. 
This phenomenon seems to show the 
Figure 1. Distribution of individual days of strike by branch. Country’s total 2006-2012
Source: Based on Chiappe (2011) and Etchemendy (2013).
* It includes mines and quarrys; manufacturing industries; electricity, gas and water; construction; com-
merce; transport and storage; communications; business services; other social services.
Teaching (public
teachers)
34.2%
Public
administration
25.7%
Teaching (private
teachers)
3.4%
Teaching (Non
teachers)
13.6%
Healthcare
20.7%
Financial
intermediation
1.6%
Other branches of
economic activity(*)
0.6%
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ineffectiveness of public policies implemented by the Government 
aimed at moderating teacher conflict in Argentina. To this end, in 
2004, Act 25,864 was passed which set a minimum of 180 school 
days per year (Art. 1). It further provided that
If the loss of school days has its origin in the inability, on 
the part in provincial jurisdictions, to afford wage debts to 
teaching personnel, be it for reasons of force majeure or for 
temporary cash flow deficiencies, they may seek financial 
assistance from National Executive Office, which will 
take immediate measures to respond to that effect. (Art. 3)
Additionally, the national government has set a starting sal-
ary (minimum revenue guaranteed per teacher) to be adopted 
compulsorily by all Argentine provincial jurisdictions to avoid 
differences among provinces. Moreover, in 2006, Act 26,075 on 
Educational Financing was passed. Its 10th article provides for the 
creation of a National Teacher Collective Bargaining to conduct 
the sector’s wage negotiations. In this sense, as pointed by Rivas, 
Vera and Bezem (2010), between 1996 and 2008 the provincial 
average wage increased by 44.9 % in real terms. The Govern-
ment announced in 2013 that the average salary of teachers rose 
between 2003 and 2013 more than 600 % (about fifty percentage 
points above the Argentine inflation rate for the period).
Figure 2. Number of individual days of strike due to labour conflicts. Private 
teachers, public teachers and other branches of activity. Country’s total 
2006-2012
Source: Based on Chiappe (2011) and Etchemendy (2013).
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It would have been expected that 
after these regulations and measures 
of educational policy, school days 
lost due to teacher strikes would have 
tended to fall, but as can be seen 
in the graph, the enactment of the 
Law had no relevance whatsoever: 
teacher strikes increased in Argentina 
in the period 2006-2009, decreased 
between 2010-2011, only to resume 
in 2012 similar levels to those of 2008. 
Thus, it becomes clear that public 
policy has lost, during this period, the 
possibility of solving teaching conflicts 
either directly or gradually. 
Moreover, we note that between 
2006 and 2012 a total of 19,277,736 
teacher workdays were lost, an aver-
age of 2,753,962 annual workdays. 
To statistically adjust lost working 
hours in each of the 24 jurisdictions, 
and because of the huge differences 
in size between them in relation to 
the number of students, teachers and 
schools, the original data base has 
been normalized to build a Teacher 
Conflict Index (annual tci). The tci is 
the ratio between the number of days 
not worked in each education sector 
and the corresponding enrolment, by 
province and year.
Table 1 shows the teacher con-
flict represented by the tci in each 
of the jurisdictions in Argentina for 
the period 2006-2012. The table 
distinguishes between the tci in the 
State sector and the private sector, 
indicating the percentage differences 
between them. 
As it is shown, the issue of teacher 
conflict, even in public schools, varies 
enormously between provinces and 
shows that teaching conflict is not 
a problem across the country but 
a characteristic of some provinces. 
Furthermore, in half of the Argentine 
provinces the problem is very serious 
and many days of class are lost. In the 
other provinces, teacher strikes seem 
to barely constitute a real problem 
for educational policy, at least in 
comparison to other jurisdictions.
The reasons for the high tci at 
certain times or in certain provinces 
are not tackled by this study. It is 
assumed that they have to do with 
the histories, situations and identities 
specific to each jurisdiction as well 
as the fiscal, wage, union and politi-
cal situation. In fact, the analysis of 
the tci should encourage research on 
teaching conflict dynamics.
Interestingly, none of the 8 provinces 
with greater tci has a relatively high 
number of students in the educational 
system. In fact, the provinces with the 
highest tci do not reach 20% of the 
school population of Argentina for 
the period, although the differences 
are deep (and unpredictable) year to 
year and province to province. 
However, when looking at the table, 
the enormous differences between 
tci in public and private education 
become evident. With this data it 
is possible to infer that the issue of 
teacher conflict and the loss of school 
days is a major problem for public 
education in almost every province, 
with the exception of Tucumán, 
La Pampa, Formosa, La Rioja and 
particularly San Luis, the only one 
out of the 24 jurisdictions where the 
tci in public schools is very low and 
increasing in private schools.
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Teacher Strikes and Enrolment  
Growth in Private Schools
Does the increase and decrease of teacher strikes have an impact 
on the enrolment growth in private schools? Figure 3 shows the 
evolution in private enrolment at the national level. An important 
and sustained increase is evidenced for the last nine years.
With the data collected, it is now possible to determine whether 
or not there is an association between lost school days due to 
strikes and the increasing number of students in private schools, 
both for each province and for the country as a whole. 
Table 1. tci by management sector and percentage difference between 
sectors, according to province 2006-2011
Province
tci - Public sector 
2006-2011
tci - Private sector 
2006-2011
Percentage  
difference tci-Pr. / 
tci-Pub.
Neuquén 1.60 0.10 -94%
Santa Cruz 1.59 na na
Entre Ríos 0.87 0.25 -72%
Tierra del Fuego 0.71 0.10 -86%
Jujuy 0.56 na na
Chaco 0.51 0.02 -96%
Catamarca 0.50 0.28 -44%
Río Negro 0.40 na na
Ciudad de Buenos Aires 0.35 0.14 -59%
Total Country 0.32 0.08 -76%
San Luis 0.31 0.82 162%
Buenos Aires 0.31 0.07 -78%
Corrientes 0.30 0.27 -10%
Santa Fe 0.30 0.13 -56%
San Juan 0.24 0.03 -86%
Córdoba 0.23 0.19 -17%
Salta 0.21 0.05 -78%
Misiones 0.16 0.12 -26%
Mendoza 0.13 0.07 -44%
Formosa 0.12 0.15 26%
La Rioja 0.11 0.16 50%
Chubut 0.11 0.07 -34%
La Pampa 0.09 0.11 13%
Tucumán 0.06 0.06 9%
Santiago del Estero 0.02 na na
Source: Based on Chiappe (2011) and Etchemendy (2013).
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Figure 3. All levels of education. Private sector enrolment (percentage over total 
enrolment). Country’s total 1996-2011.
Source: Own preparation on the basis of the information provided by ra, DiNiece, Ministry of Education.
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Figure 4 compares the growth of 
private enrolment with that of the 
teacher labour conflict for the period 
2006-2011.
While the growth of enrolment 
in private education shows a steady 
growth over time, the tci shows sig-
nificant ups and downs: the increased 
enrolment in private education post-
2003 never stops, while teacher labor 
disputes increase and decrease.
Figure 5 shows the spread of the 
Argentine provinces in relation to the 
growth of private education enrol-
ment and the Teacher Conflict Index.
The graph shows no significant 
association (R2=0.08) between the 
growth of private school enrolment 
and the tci indicating class days 
missed because of teacher strikes. 
In highly conflictive provinces private 
education has increased relatively (as 
in the case of the Province of Neu-
quén) and conversely, provinces with 
less conflict have shown disparate 
behavior. In San Luis and La Pampa, 
days lost because of teacher disputes 
in the State sector remain low, while 
privatisation of enrolment increases 
abruptly. Meanwhile, in Chubut and 
Tucumán both State teaching conflicts 
and the increase in private enrolment 
are not significant. Therefore, the type 
of dispersion shown does not enable 
to identify covariance relationships. 
The cases of Santa Fe and Chubut 
are worth mentioning. During this 
period, in these provinces strike days 
decreased while the enrolment in 
private schools remained unchanged.
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Figure 5. Provinces according to the correlation between teacher conflict 
index (tci) in the State sector and the percentage change in private enrol-
ment between 2006 and 2011.
Source: Based on Chiappe (2011), Etchemendy (2013) and ra, DiNiece, Ministry of Education.
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Conclusions
Statistical evidence shows, first, 
the importance of teacher strikes 
in Argentina, which hegemonizes 
the landscape of labor unrest. It 
also shows how public policy mea-
sures to mitigate their amount and 
frequency (salary raise, National 
Teacher Collective Bargaining, 180 
days of class, etc.) have resulted not 
only insufficient, but did not even 
seem to have moderated teacher 
conflict over time, both at a national 
level and at least in a large group of 
provinces.
While the media’s common sense 
attributes to teacher strikes a central 
role in the growth of private education 
enrolment after 2003, the evidence 
analyzed between 2006 and 2011—a 
period of high teacher conflict as well 
as of great growth in the enrolment 
in private schools in every province, 
except for Santa Fe—clearly shows 
that it is not possible to predict an 
increase (or decrease) in enrolment in 
private schools from the occurrence 
(or not) of teacher strikes and the con-
sequent loss of school days.
When facing the occurrence of 
more teacher strikes, it is not neces-
sarily to be expected that there will 
be more students in private schools. 
Conversely, a decrease in the number 
of teacher strikes in no way would 
explain a virtual enrolment growth 
in public education. Therefore, the 
actions of teacher unions based on 
strikes and loss of class days are 
not relevant in terms of impact on 
the dynamics of the most important 
political/educational phenomenon 
in the post-2003 period that is 
the growth of the private sector of 
education.
This does not mean that the exis-
tence of teacher strikes in public 
schools does not influence the pref-
erences made explicit by many fam-
ilies that choose private schools, as 
noted in Scialabba’s study (2006). 
What has been shown here is that 
there is no association between the 
two variables for the period 2006-
2011, but it has not been denied 
that there may possibly be a relation 
between them.
It is necessary to continue study-
ing this issue to understand whether 
families that choose private schools 
assume teacher strikes as something 
of central importance, beyond their 
mere occurrence, and that this per-
ception trascends periods and terri-
tories. Many social sectors may have 
assumed teacher strikes, and the con-
sequent loss of school days, as a “nat-
ural” and inherent characteristic of 
the public school, even beyond what 
happens in objective reality.
Furthermore, this study has analyzed 
the working days lost in schools due 
to teaching conflicts, which accounts 
just for part of the days in which public 
schools remain closed or that students 
do not have classes. Other reasons may 
be teacher absenteeism, personnel 
training, among others, as indicated by 
Carnoy (2005). Future studies should 
analyze the impact of strikes as well 
as the effect of teacher absenteeism or, 
better still, the impact of “closed public 
schools” in the increase of families’ 
private school choice decisions, 
especially since 2003.
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Both previous evidence that showed families’ preferences 
for private schools because of teacher strikes, and the evidence 
observed in this study, would indicate that the public school 
in Argentina experience a problem of “institutional image” for 
important sectors of society, regardless of the objective conditions 
and processes of social reality. This, in turn, reinforces the idea 
“public school = closed school.”
Educational policy has, then, a double task: it needs to solve the 
problem of teacher strikes as a means of improving the institutional 
image of public schools, and take other actions to transform 
the social imaginary that associates public schools with closed 
schools. Working on both aspects, might help to moderate the 
unprecedented growth of private education in Argentina.
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